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THE BURGER COURT
AND "OUR FEDERALISM"
HENRY P. MONAGHAN
Dicey derided federal government as "weak government;" ' others have
found genius lurking in its institutional arrangements. But most students, as
Professor S. R. Davis's illuminating little book makes clear,2 have considerable
difficulty in identifying what federal government is, whether the concept is
approached analytically, legally, descriptively or normatively. American law-
yers are not inclined to pursue such inquiries too far. For, like Justice Black,
they are concerned only with "Our Federalism ' 3 and, like Justice Stewart and
obscenity,4 they know it when they see it. Moreover, American lawyers have,
in large measure, confined their attention to one specific component of "Our
Federalism;" its legal content.
Historically, the major "legal" issue in "Our Federalism" has been substan-
tive in nature, i.e., the extent to which the basic charter mandates a clear divi-
sion of powers, one that both protects and confines the central and state gov-
ernments in their respective spheres. That issue is devoid of current
significance. The radical transformation that has occurred in the structure of
"Our Federalism" in the nearly two centuries of our existence has emptied the
concept of nearly all legal content and replaced it with a frank recognition of
the legal hegemony of the national government. This occurred well before
the arrival of the Burger Court, and that Court shows no signs of attempting
to undo the past.
In recent years, attention has been drawn to a second, process-oriented di-
mension of "Our Federalism:" we have come to accept as an article of faith
that adequate federal judicial and administrative mechanisms should exist to
enforce federally secured rights. The Burger Court has been the object of
much criticism at this level, some of it of an inflamed character. I think that
the criticisms have been vastly overstated and that the Burger Court has done
little to impair the Warren Court's legacy of strong federal enforcement of
federal rights.
1. A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 171 (10th ed.
1959).
2. S. DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE, A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME IN QUEST OF A MEANING
(1978).
3. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
4. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
I
Substantively viewed, "Our Federalism" is the central device by which our
vast nation has hoped to reconcile its needs for unity with its needs for diver
sity.5 Historically, substantive federalism questions have been at the center of
the American constitutional order. Pared to essentials, the constitutional con-
troversy has focused upon the respective claims of the nation and the states to
determine the content of public policy. The controversy has gone through
several stages, with the emerging national consensus becoming triumphant in
each instance. The decisions of the early Marshall Court and the Civil War
Amendments represented important stages in this process. But while they vin-
dicated nationally formulated norms against claims of state (or, more pre-
cisely, sectional) autonomy,6 neither the Marshall Court decisions nor the Civil
War Amendments were understood at the time to establish the complete legal
hegemony of the national government.
That development came during (or, more precisely, at the end of) the pe-
riod of national growth and industrialization.7 Regulatory efforts of this era
raised questions concerning national authority to regulate a complex, highly
integrated economy dominated by nationally active corporate giants, as well as
questions of national competence to provide minimum economic security for
our people. As a matter of constitutional theory these issues were resolved by
1941. Again, national authority was vindicated-this time through judicial ac-
ceptance of broad interpretations of the commerce and spending powers.
While the important judicial decisions are too well known to justify review
here, the extent to which they confirmed a major reshaping of the original
federal system is usefully recalled. Of course, if Marshall was right in as-
serting that the commerce clause was intended to reach "those internal con-
cerns which affect the states generally,"8 national legislative power necessarily
expanded as the economy entered a national, industrial, highly interdepen-
5. National political parties, now in a period of evident decline, were another such device.
They too had a federal structure. FREUND, FOUNDATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF AMERICAN FED-
ERALISM IN FEDERALISM AND THE NEW NATIONS OF AFRICA 162 (1964). On the decline of the na-
tional political parties, see M. JANOWITZ, THE LAST HALF-CENTURY 11, 482-83, 510-34 (1978). See
also, J. Herbers, The Party's Over for the Political Parties, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1979, § 6 (Magazine),
at 158.
6. Prior to the Civil War, slavery proponents had denied, correctly in my judgment, congres-
sional authority to prohibit slavery in the slave-holding states. But they went much further, as-
serting a lack of national competence to bar slavery in the territories; indeed, some posited a
congressional duty to protect that institution there. D. FEHRENBACKER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978), provides an excellent study of the consti-
tutional problems involved.
7. I put aside the brief period of congressional interest in securing broad rights to the Freed-
men. By 1875 the political energy behind that effort was completely spent and the Court's most
noted Reconstruction decisions confirmed that fact. For a sympathetic view of those decisions, see'
Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 39 (1979).
8. Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
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dent stage. Even so, the present centralization of economic control in the na-
tional government would have astonished the framers, in practical terms if
not in terms of constitutional theory.9
But the real transformation of "Our Federalism" has been worked by the
modern federal role in taxation, borrowing and spending. Here the change
seems to be one of theory, radically altering the financial premises of 1789
federalism. The framers envisaged a "clear separation between state and fed-
eral governments, with each provided with the sources of public revenue nec-
essary for support of the functions assigned to it."'1' Exercises of national
taxing and borrowing powers in this century have changed all that, not only
by the huge accumulations of federal dollars but in the drying up of potential
state revenue sources. Both results are far beyond anything contemplated
by the framers. More importantly, the framers surely never imagined the re-
cent but now deeply ingrained practice of massive transfers of federal dollars
to state and local governments. I am speaking not simply of the restrictions
attached to the transfers but of the actual transfers themselves. Once the Su-
preme Court recognized the congressional power to spend for the general
welfare extends beyond the article 1, § 8 checklist,11 twentieth-century Con-
gresses inevitably asserted the right to finance functions that traditionally the
states had exclusively financed or regulated. And, quite plainly, the Court
could not maintain a line between those functions "assigned" to the states and
those functions "assigned" to the national government without overtly re-
sorting to the doctrine of dual federalism. 2 Inevitably, the logic of that con-
cept yielded to that of "cooperative federalism." This change in premise is the
foundation of the 1937 decisions upholding the Social Security Act. 13 More-
over, with the power to spend unlimited except by constitutional prohibitions,
federal monies-with or without conditions attached-may be transferred not
only to states but to their subordinate units of government. No purpose is ex-
cluded: federal resources can be utilized for the specific purpose of improv-
9. Gibbons, for example, assumes that some economic conduct could not be reached by Con-
gress. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-45.
10. Hamilton, On Nonconstitutional Management of a Constitutional Problem, PUBLIC INTEREST,
Winter 1978, at 111, 113. Indeed, eighteenth-century governmental theory assumed that the
same federal model would operate in the financial relations between state and local governmental
units. On the presidential power of the purse, see, L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER
(1975).
11. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-67 (1936).
12. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936). See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARv. L. REV. 693, 700-02 (1974).
13. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937). A judicially posited line between spending for "matters of national, as distinguished from
local welfare," United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936), results not in a dichotomy of as-
signed functions but an area of considerable overlap. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640
(1937) ("There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large").
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ing the quality of local police departments and for the more general purpose
of "saving" financially hard pressed cities and corporations.
14
If these results under the commerce and spending powers seem inevitable
as a matter of judicial construction of the Constitution, the end result is still a
profound alteration of the original constitutional framework. The power of
the national government to bring about compliance with nationally defined
policies through regulation and conditional spending is, for all practical pur-
poses, unlimited. The legal hegemony of the national government is, there-
fore, firmly established. In major part at least "Our Federalism" is a political,
rather than a legal, doctrine. I"
All this was well established before the arrival of the Burger Court. The
Warren Court had already participated in the development toward centralized
power, helping to define the extent to which the national government could
guarantee political and civil rights to its citizens on a nationwide basis by pro-
viding for more effective enforcement of constitutionally specified norms and
by imposing upon the states and private parties norms which go beyond those
specified in the Constitution. Here, I think it fair to say that the Burger Court
has simply confirmed the views of its predecessor." As yet, its decisions cast
no material, constitutionally-grounded federalism doubts about the power of
Congress to protect civil rights and liberties.
The Burger Court has, in short, formulated no serious judicial threat to
the primacy of national legislative authority. The sole significant constitutional
decision, the academically beloved National League of Cities v. Usery,"7 suggests
the existence of some structurally-derived restrictions upon national power to
legislate in ways that impair "integral" state functions.', But that decision has,
as yet, shown no generative power and, in any event, is by its own terms not a
barrier to national control over the pyivate sector.' 9 Nor is it likely to consti-
tute a measurable barrier to national control over the states through condi-
tioned spending20 and regulation based upon the Civil War Amendments.
21
On the whole, therefore, the Burger Court has not significantly altered the
14. See generally Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 847, 871-83 (1979).
15. See, for example, Kaden, supra note 14.
16. This seems to me particularly true if the Court's generous and expansive reading of civil
rights legislation is taken into account, as its decisions under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
§ 1982 make clear. E.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
17. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
18. Whether "impairment" includes anything other than substantial economic burdens re-
mains to be seen. E.g., Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070, 1083-84 (5th Cir.
1979). Compare Kaden, supra note 14, at 889-93, suggesting that National League of Cities place
limits on federal coupling of state legislative and administrative machinery.
19. 426 U.S. at 840-41.
20. See Kaden, supra note 14, at 874-81, 893-96.
21. The cases and commentary are collected at 58-60, H. MONAGHAN, 1979 SUPPLEMENT, to P.
FREUND ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as H. MONAGHAN, 1979 SUPPLEMENT].
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conventional wisdom that the Constitution remits the states to the national po-
litical process for the protection of their interests. 22
The bulk of the Burger Court's substantive innovation has been at the
level of non-constitutional doctrine. The Court has shown an increasing reluc-
tance to displace state law by expansive construction of federal statutes23 or
through the development of federal common law. 24 Decisions refusing to ex-
pand the range of judge made law at the expense of state autonomy are, I
think, an important development. Still, I know of no empirical basis for a
complaint that these decisions, either singly or in combination, are working a
major revision in the previously existing federal-state pattern. 25
II
In recent times "Our Federalism" theorists have been concerned with
process as well as substance. Those who object to the Burger Court's brand of
federalism emphasize changes supposedly wrought by the Court in this area,
specifically in the relationship between federal and state judicial systems. Citing
Younger v. Harris26 and Stone v. Powell,2 7 critics focus on the Court's assertedly
restrictive attitude toward the authority of the national courts to vindicate fed-
eral constitutional and statutory norms against state officials. 28 That focus is
an exceedingly important one; maintaining adequate enforcement mecha-
nisms for federally secured rights is, to my mind, nearly equal in importance
to the rights themselves. 29 The criticism presently expresses a legitimate, but
minor, concern. Empirical evidence is lacking on the impact of the Court's re-
strictive decisions on the quantity and proportion of federal rights now left
unvindicated. Accordingly, the focus must be at the doctrinal level, and (with
deference to those who think otherwise) here the degree of change does not
as yet seem very large.
The Warren Court's expansive concept of constitutional guarantees was,
not surprisingly, accompanied by a correspondingly expansive concept of fed-
22. For recent elaboration of this theme, see Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). But see Kaden, supra note 14,
at 857-68.
23. E.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). For a collection of cases on statu-
tory preemption, see Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
24. E.g., United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U.S. 193 (1979).
25. Nor do I detect any significant changes in the Court's attitude toward questions of
unconstitutional burdens on commerce. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
26. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
27. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
28. See, for example, the articles cited in H. MONAGHAN, 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 21, at 7
footnote.
29. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1392-97
(1973).
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eral judicial authority to vindicate those guarantees.3 0 A considerable lowering
of access barriers to the federal trial courts occurred with respect to many of
the traditional impediments, such as standing, ripeness, mootness, exhaustion
of state administrative remedies, and abstention. I am in general sympathy
with this judicial door opening philosophy, particularly in the Warren Court's
willingness to permit prospective state defendants to become federal plain-
tiffs.3 1 The latter result is not only salutary public policy, but consistent with
the enormous congressional enlargement of federal judicial authority which
followed the Civil War.
3 2
But whatever the weight of one's bias in favor of national judicial author-
ity, countervailing federalism concerns suggest the plausibility of some limits.
The Burger Court has expressed concern in several areas. The first, repre-
sented by Younger and Stone, is federal judicial superintendence of the general
administration of the state criminal process. With deference to those who
think otherwise, it seems to me inconsistent with the premises of our federal
structure to permit, absent extraordinary circumstances, lower federal court
monitoring of state criminal convictions that have been reviewed by state su-
preme courts. Accordingly, Stone v. Powell's bar to collateral review of search
and seizure claims is intuitively attractive. Nonetheless, I think the decision is
hard to defend. The Court's statement that the exclusionary rule is not part
of the fourth amendment right, but only a judicially fashioned, pragmatically-
limited "remedy ' 33 is not adequate: this explanation throws into doubt the
Court's authority to apply the exclusionary rule on direct review from the
state supreme courts.3 4 Moreover, from an institutional perspective, the Court
seems to have comparatively little running room to shape federal door closing
doctrine in habeas cases to vindicate its view of an appropriate distribution of
authority between federal and state tribunals. For, whatever the wisdom of its
action, Congress seems to have codified relatively full federal collateral review
of state criminal convictions. 5 The Court's few efforts at restructuring the
reach of federal habeas have been marked by intellectual chaos3 6 and, despite
Stone v. Powell and a few other decisions,3 7 the Court now seems reconciled,
30. Monaghan, Book Review, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1970).
31. Cf. Note, Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1490 (1967).
32. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-43 (1972).
33. 428 U.S. at 486-87.
34. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term--Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1975).
35. Justice Brennan's dissent in Powell seems to speak directly to this issue. 428 U.S. at 518-19.
36. See, for example, 1977 SUPPLEMENT TO HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1977) at 256-58.
37. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (failure to raise federal claim in state pro-
ceeding works forfeiture of habeas review absent a showing of cause for the default and actual
prejudice). For penetrating comment, see Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal
Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1050 (1978).
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however reluctantly, to the availability of federal collateral attack, at least for
claims challenging the reliability of the conviction.38
Federal judicial interference with pending state criminal proceedings has
been a matter of concern to the Burger Court and to its critics. The holding
of Younger v. Harris, if not its inflated language, seems to be a sound applica-
tion of the "federal common law" '39 which normally should govern the distri-
bution of authority between the federal and the state courts. Moreover, the
Younger result is not foreclosed by the generalized language of the statutes
conferring jurisdiction upon the federal trial courts.4 0 More troublesome for
me is the reverse preemption doctrine of Hicks v. Miranda,4 permitting a
subsequently filed state court proceeding to abort a prior federal proceed-
ing. The objections to that holding are convincingly stated in the dissenting
opinion.
Once again, however, one needs to keep the entire picture in mind. Nei-
ther Younger v. Harris nor the various other judicially fashioned door closing
devices such as the various abstention doctrines42 have seriously curtailed ac-
cess to the federal courts for the purpose of testing the constitutional validity
of state statutes and administrative practices. Every Term of Court bears
witness to that fact. 43 Access to the federal trial forum exists even with respect
to state criminal statutes, as Steffel v. Thompson,44 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 45
and Wooley v. Maynard 46 make clear, at least if the federal plaintiff has not vi-
olated the statute before initiating the challenge. 47 Justice Rehnquist's efforts
38. E.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (sufficiency of evidence to support state
criminal conviction); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (grand jury discrimination). See The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 60, 210-18 (1979). I do not wish to suggest that the
limitations potentially suggested by the current cases would not work some significant changes.
Indeed, I think the habeas cases represent the strongest illustrations of such change.
39. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973) at 427. Indeed, I would have thought prior to
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) that Congress had mandated such a result in 28 U.S.C. §
2283. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
40. For the opposite view see articles cited in H. MONAGHAN, 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 21,
at 7, n.7-4. On the current statute of Younger, see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). 1 should
add that, though the justifications are less compelling, I would extend Younger to pending civil
proceedings, even between private parties. Kenner v. Morris, 600 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1979)
(declining to interfere in a domestic relations matter pending in state court).
41. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
42. See, for example, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
43. E.g., Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts vFeeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Parham v.
J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
44. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
45. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
46. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). Compare Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1979).
47. On this specific issue see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) and the
discussion in the HART & WECHSLER, 1977 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 36, at 179-81. For perceptive
discussion of the preclusive and stare decisis effects of federal declaratory decrees, see Shapiro,
State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 759 (1979).
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at a more general lockout-exemplified in an extraordinary dissent in which
he would have held that invocation of an "optional" state administrative pro-
ceeding requires a litigant to utilize state judicial remedies-has not carried a
majority of the Court. 41
Justice Rehnquist's view should not prevail. At base, it would cut deeply
into the concept of federalism embodied in the great watershed decisions in
Ex parte Young 49 and Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles. 50
Since those cases, it has been clear that any reasonably well focused
constitutionally-based controversy between private parties and state officials
can be litigated in the federal courts; 51 and, once there, the federal courts
possess ample remedial power to vindicate any federally established rights.
The Court is, to be sure, not sympathetic to entertaining these controversies
when they involve potentially sweeping "structural" decrees requiring a close,
ongoing monitoring of state governmental institutions.5 2 But, even in this
context, access to the federal courts is available when federal constitutional
rights are sharply implicated. 53 The central fact is that the Burger Court has
not closed the doors of the federal courts through wholesale reversal of juris-
dictional doctrine. The Court's one constitutionally-grounded remedy-restrict-
ing rule, Edelman v. Jordan,54 another academic must, is of little functional
consequence. While it insulates the state treasury from damage claims, it does
not bar federal actions against state officials to bring about prospective com-
pliance with federal norms. 55 Nor does it bar damage actions where Congress,
acting under the Civil War Amendments, strips away sovereign immunity.
56
48. City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905 (1979). 61 L.Ed. 2d 872 (dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari). Justice Rehnquist's view is precisely opposite to mine. Pressure should force,
not discourage, an "optional" state administrative remedy. This would mean abandonment of the
sometimes woodenly stated doctrine that exhaustion is not required in § 1983 actions. E.g., Ellis v.
Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975) (dictum). A far more discriminating approach is necessary.
See Powell, J., concurring in Runyon v. McCray, 427 U.S. 160, 186 (1976); Comment, Exhaustion
of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (1974).
49. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
50. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
51. Under Home Telegraph, this is true even if the challenged official conduct is assumed to be
illegal under state law. Of course under the rule of Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S.
175 (1909), the state ultra vires issue should be reached and decided first. But the rise of
absention doctrine requires, ordinarily, resort to the state courts to pass on doubtful state law is-
sues. For an influential analysis of absention, see Field, Absention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of
the Pullman Absention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (1974).
52. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
53. E.g., Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979); Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 715 (1978): see also the articles cited in H. MONAGHAN, 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 21,
at 22-
54. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
55. Id. at 664, citing the "watershed" decision in Ex parte Young.
56. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). See
also Hutto v. Hinney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). But § 1983 has been held not to embody a congres-
sional intention to strip the states of their immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). The
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Nor does it apply in any form to § 1983 damage actions against "individual"
officials or, indeed, to suits against county and municipal bodies.
5 7
III
Despite the general thrust of Ex parte Young and Home Telephone & Tele-
graph, the Court has shown obvious discomfort over federal trial court super-
vision of a second area of state routine: the hiring, promotion and discharge
of state employees, including any alleged "defamation" occurring in the
course of these procedures."8 The typical claim is not one of violation of a
specific constitutional right or of an impermissible class-based discrimina-
tion.59 Rather, the paradigm involves a disgruntled state employee separated
from public employment and/or criticized, whose disgruntlement is translated
into claims that the termination decision was "arbitrary" (i.e., wrong), or in-
volved "defamation" (i.e., criticism).6" While it is possible to view these cases as
involving constitutional torts because the state is the employer or actor, they
do not in fact sharply implicate constitutional values. One can, therefore, sym-
pathize with the desire to prevent automatic "appeals" of these cases to the
federal trial courts. To be sure, the Court has extended its inhospitability to
these suits to the arguably very different problem of challenges to the suffi-
ciency of the procedural framework for making the termination decision. 6 1
That extension is at least plausible for the apparent fear is that the federal
trial courts will become mired in a Serbonian bog of minute procedural chal-
lenges.
Nonetheless, the route taken to close the federal courthouse to these pub-
lic employment challenges is another matter. Constrained by its precedents
from rejecting these challenges on jurisdictional grounds, the Court has
opined that the public employee's interest in his reputation or in continued
specific employment are not, standing alone, part of the liberty or property
protected by the fourteenth amendment, at least for purposes of procedural
circuits have given Edelman limited scope even in the Article 1, § 8 context. E.g., Jennings v. Illi-
nois Office of Ed., 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1979); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278
(9th Cir. 1979); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
57. Municipalities and counties are "persons" for purposes of § 1983. Monell v. Dep't. of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See also Lake County Estates, Inc. v.. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
58. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) involved defamation of a private individual rather than
a public employee. But I think Paul is a typical application of the rationale, and that the routine
context is criticism made in connection with public employment. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624
(1977); Monaghan, Of "Libertv" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L.J. 405, 443 n.235 (1977).
59. Of course, when claims of this character are implicated, access to the federal trial courts is
available. E.g. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
60. E.g., Vruno v. Schwarzwalder, 600 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1979); Needleman v. Bohlen, 602
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1979).
61. Bishop v. Wood, 424 U.S. 341 (1976). The decisions would, of course, permit a state to es-
tablish a sufficient interest in specific public employment to constitute property, and thereby to
commit itself to constitutionally adequate termination procedures.
"OUR FEDERALISM"
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
due process.6 2 I have reviewed these developments elsewhere 6 3 Suffice it to
say that what we see is a form of what psychologists call displacement-the
desire to close the doors of the federal trial courts to certain kinds of substan-
tive and procedural claims,6 4 an essentially jurisdictional concept, has been re-
solved by the narrowing scope of substantive constitutional guarantees.
Here, as elsewhere, displacement has its costs. The practical impact of the
Court's concern with liberty and property is largely confined to claims by pub-
lic employees; it has not barred the Court from addressing the merits of the
procedural and substantive due process claims of private parties.6 5 However,
the general doctrine leaves the profession with a feeling that meaningful dis-
tinctions seldom exist between interests held to satisfy the threshold of liberty
and property and those that do not.6  Patent anomalies have appeared: a
woman discharged from an untenured position with a Congressman on
gender-based grounds has a right of action under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment despite the fact that neither liberty nor property is in-
volved in a specific, probationary position. 67 Moreover, not only is a proba-
tionary employee's interest in a specific job not liberty or property, neither is
her interest in her reputation. Yet if defamation occurs in the discharge of an
untenured employee, a name-clearing administrative hearing is required. 68 In
law, as in mathematics, summing zeros does not lead to a total greater than
zero.
Erratic and anomalous application of a doctrine requiring identification of
62. It eludes me how the result can be any different for purposes of substantive due process.
Monaghan, supra note 58, at 421 n. 112.
63. Monaghan, supra note 58.
64. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976) makes this plain:
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of per-
sonnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact
that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our
affairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require federal
judicial review for every such error . . . . The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions.
See also, for example, the cases cited in note 60. Of course, the manipulation of the content of
"due process" has relevance at the federal level also. E.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974). But given the ample statutory and administrative protection afforded to federal employ-
ees, it is not clear that the matter has much practical importance in the federal government.
65. E.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979);
Martinez v. California, 100 S. Ct. 553 (1980). But see Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
66. Compare Bishop v. Wood, supra note 61, with Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978). See H. MONAGHAN, 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 21, at 171-72.
67. The problem is ignored in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). How does the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment due process clause even begin to operate if the
nontenured claim to specific employment constitutes neither liberty or property? The substantive
right to be free from discrimination exists only if it implicates a liberty or property interest.
Monaghan, supra note 58, at 421-22, particularly at note 112.
68. E.g., Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977). See Lyons v. Sullivan, 602 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 159 (1979). Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 42 (1979).
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discrete liberty or property interests is not, however, my most serious objec-
tion to the Court's new obsession. Most disturbing is that the entire develop-
ment has proceeded in ignorance of fundamental assumptions of the constitu-
tional order established by over seven decades of precedent: the terms life,
liberty and property were to be read as a unit so to embrace every interest
valued by sensible persons. The core constitutional issue, in that view, should
always center upon justification for the challenged state action. 69 No case has
been made, on the grounds of either principle or policy, for reverting to an
atomistic approach to the life, liberty, or property protected by the amend-
ment. 70 In any event, I think it is obvious that federalism considerations will
not suffice to create such a case.
IV
The Burger Court has not materially altered the central role of the federal
courts in monitoring state activity; at most, it has affected the margins. But
that is not the end of the matter for the role of the federal courts should not
be viewed as an unfluctuating constant. 71 Rather, the nature and direction of
federal trial court intervention should be responsive to current political neces-
sities. Nineteen eighty is not 1954; the state courts, trial as well as appellate,
cannot be assumed to be now unresponsive to claims of federal right. Accord-
ingly, we need to reexamine the role of the federal trial courts in light of the
current needs of federalism. For several reasons such reexamination must
come from Congress rather than from the Court. First, the existing federal
statutory pattern, the accumulated jurisdictional precedents, and the case-by-
case nature of adjudication sharply restrict the possibility for the Supreme
Court to develop rationally an appropriate distribution of authority between
the national and the state courts. Second, decisions concerning the appropri-
ate distribution are essentially political in character. Even if congressional
veto power is ultimately reserved, delegation to the Court of the authority to
define the appropriate scope of federal trial court supervision of state officials
would materially impair the Court's ability to stay, or to appear to stay, above
the hue and cry of political issues.
Ultimately, of course, we search for criteria for the exclusion or curtail-
ment of federal jurisdiction. This includes consideration of such diverse and
frequently elusive factors as: the volume of litigation; the nature and relative
importance of the underlying federal interests; the proportion of meritorious
to nonmeritorious claims; and the impact of federal court intervention on le-
gitimate state interests. I am, of course, not suggesting the desirability of any
69. Monaghan, supra note 58, at 411-14.
70. This is true whether the language of constitutional law is viewed as a special language or
as ordinary language in a special setting. J. BRIGHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE, AN INTERPRE-A
TATION OF JUDICIAL DECISION (1978).
71. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
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wholesale reexamination of the jurisdiction of the federal trial courts, nor
could one reasonably expect any such result given the general force of inertia
and the special force of those interests presently satisfied, in whole or major
part, with the existing distributional pattern. It is possible, however, that a
limited and meaningful assessment could come about with respect to specific
categories of cases or on specific issues. I think that federal habeas jurisdiction
should be overhauled. Given the fundamental presuppositions concerning the
role of the state courts in the federal system, the existing jurisdiction is devoid
of a coherent theoretical justification. Careful consideration should also be
given to whether certain types of litigation, such as challenges to zoning regu-
lations as uncompensated takings, should be excluded altogether. Other chal-
lenges might be sharply curtailed, as in the area of public employment and
wrongful denial of statutory entitlements. Even if there is no exclusion, the
conditions governing the availability of federal relief need reassessment. Fo-
cused legislative attention, for example, should be given to such matters as the
extent to which exhaustion of administrative remedies should be required and.
when abstention is appropriate.
V
If one returns from fancy to fact, it seems plain to me that "Our Federal-
ism" has, in recent history, been a political doctrine. It has recognized the le-
gal supremacy of national political authority and the central and legitimate
place of the national courts in the vindication of federal rights and interests.
One can quarrel about the details, but taken in the main, the Burger Court
has left intact the federal edifice bequeathed by its predecessors.
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